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With the adoption of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (Environmental Side Agreement)1 and
the establishment of the North American Commission on Environ-
mental Cooperation (CEC), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFA)2 goes further in addressing environmental
concerns than any trade agreement in history.3 The dispute resolution
mechanisms laid out in the Environmental Side Agreement under the
CEC and in NAFrA Chapter 20 under the Free Trade Commission
set a bold precedent for the resolution of environmental disputes
within a trade context. Although the creation of these mechanisms has
not silenced all critics, the Environmental Side Agreement provisions,
including the limited use of trade sanctions to encourage Party
enforcement of national environmental law, represent a step forward
in the evolution of the legal process for resolving trade disputes.
These modern dispute settlement procedures will strengthen the
ability of the new NAFTA institutions to reconcile difficult trade and
environmental objectives and may encourage the Parties not to rely
on more traditional and dangerous unilateral measures.
4
1. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Dec. 17,1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement].
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 14,1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA will regulate areas far beyond the traditional focus of trade
agreements, including issues ranging from investment to intellectual property and public health.
In order to effectively address the expanse of subject matter covered under the agreement,
NAFTA includes broad dispute resolution procedures. See Rodger Schlickeisen, We Can Have
Free Trade and a Clean Environment, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 6, 1993, at A13.
3. Richard B. Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection, 27
INT'L LAW. 751, 753 (1993).
4. See Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA: The
Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT'L LAW. 603, 603 (1993).
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NAFTA's Chapter 20 establishes the basic structure for the
resolution of Party disputes.5 A complaint brought under Chapter 20
will proceed through a three step process: (1) consultations between
the Parties to the dispute; (2) mediation by the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission if these consultations do not resolve the issue; and (3)
the establishment of an arbitral panel as a mechanism of last resort.6
The settlement procedures of Chapter 20 will be triggered when
questions arise regarding either the interpretation or application of
the Agreement or when "a Party considers that an actual or proposed
measure of another Party would be inconsistent with the obligations
of this Agreement." Only Parties to NAFTA are allowed to bring
challenges under Chapter 20. Private citizens, corporations, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) do not have standing to
challenge a Party under Chapter 20.8
For disputes arising from alleged violations of either NAFTA or
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr),9 the com-
plaining Party may choose to utilize the settlement procedures of
either GATT or NAFTA respectively."0 However, if the dispute is
over national measures designed to protect health or the environment,
the defending Party may insist on using the NAFTA process.11 In
this way, the observance of certain international environmental
treaties, 2 and the protection of domestic environmental, health, and
safety measures can be assured. 3 Furthermore, forcing the Parties
to abide by the NAFTA settlement procedures in these cases will
place the burden of proving inconsistency between the challenged
Party's national environmental and health standards and the
5. NAFrA, supra note 2, at 694-98 (citing arts. 2003-2019).
6. Id. at 694-95 (citing arts. 2006-2008); see Bialos & Siegel, supra note 4, at 615
(describing the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism).
7. NAFTA, supra note 2, at 694 (citing art. 2004).
8. Id. (citing art. 2005).
9. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1,700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1969) [hereinafter GATI].
10. NAFTA, supra note 2, at 694 (citing art. 2005(1)).
11. Id. (citing art. 2005(4)).
12. See id. at 297-98 (citing art. 104, which allows the Convention on International Tiade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal to take precedence over NAFTA provisions).
13. Id. at 377-83 (citing ch. 7B concerning Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures); id. at 386-
92 (citing ch. 9 concerning Standards-Related Measures).
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Agreement's standards on the challenging Party.14  In contrast,
GATT places the burden on the defending Party.5 NAFTA
therefore takes a deferential approach toward national sovereignty
concerns.
The dispute settlement process under the Environmental Side
Agreement has a much narrower focus than the Chapter 20 process.
Under the Side Agreement, the dispute resolution procedures cover
challenges to a Party's enforcement of its domestic environmental
laws.16 This settlement process, like that of Chapter 20, begins with
consultations between the Parties involved. 7 If those consultations
do not resolve the conflict, the matter is turned over to the CEC
Council, which can investigate, hear experts, issue recommendations,
or propose mediation." Finally, if the matter remains unresolved,
the CEC can establish an arbitral panel upon request of any of the
consulting Parties 9 to decide if "there has been a persistent pattern
of failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its
environmental law, and to make findings, determinations and
recommendations. '
This Note proposes that the dispute settlement process adopted
for the CEC in the Environmental Side Agreement strikes the proper
balance between respect for national sovereignty and the creation of
a forum that will encourage a good faith approach towards the
enforcement of national environmental law. By including a trade
sanction option as a means of last resort to punish the most flagrant
and persistent cases of Party non-enforcement,2' the CEC maintains
its focus on the rewards of the consultative process. This balancing
of priorities also provides a limited response to certain criticisms of
14. ld. at 382 (citing art. 723(6) concerning the burden of proof in Sanitary and
Phytosanitary measures cases); id at 391 (citing art. 914(4) regarding the burden of proof in
Standards-Related Measures cases).
15. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 182-83 (1969)
(describing a defending party's rebuttal requirements to a challenge of "nullification or
impairment" of GATT benefits).
16. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1490 (citing art. 22 which discusses
consultations on enforcement matters).
17. Id. (describing the consultative process under the Environmental Side Agreement);
NAFTA, supra note 2, at 694 (citing art. 2006 which describes the consultative process under
NAFTA).
18. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1490 (citing art. 23).
19. Id. at 1490-91, 1492 (citing arts. 24, 33).
20. Id. at 1491-92 (citing art. 28).
21. See infra notes 119-91 and accompanying text.
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the NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute resolution process, 2 and serves as
a starting point from which future negotiators can approach trade and
environmental issues.z
In presenting these conclusions, this Note seeks first to analyze
the political forces surrounding NAFTA and the negotiations which
affected the final formulation of the Environmental Side Agreement.
Part II will address the environmental concerns raised by NAFTA and
its Chapter 20 dispute resolution mechanism. These concerns are
particularly important in order to understand the final formulation of
the dispute resolution provisions. Part III will discuss the Parties'
early draft proposals for the CEC and their dispute resolution
mechanisms. Part IV will present a detailed description of the CEC
structure and its dispute resolution procedures, while selected criticism
of the compromises achieved will be evaluated in Part V. Part VI
concludes that the structure and procedures of the CEC and the
mechanism for the settlement of disputes recognize a new relationship
between trade and the environment and represent a step towards the
ultimate goal of sustainable economic development.
II. ENVIRONMENTALIST CONCERNS WITH NAFTA
A. General Concerns
During the political debate over ratification of NAFTA in the
United States, a number of environmental groups expressed dissatis-
faction with the treaty's environmental protection provisions.24
Although the United States, Canada, and Mexico all had laws to
regulate environmental protection and to provide for the punishment
of environmental infractions, Mexico had a history of erratic
enforcement of its environmental lawsO Because NAFTA was
22. See infra notes 26-57 and accompanying text.
23. Stewart, supra note 3, at 760 (predicting that NAFTA successes will likely be emulated
in other free trade agreements).
24. See, e.g., Letter from Defenders of Wildlife et al., to Mickey Kantor, United States
Trade Representative (Mar. 4, 1993) (authored jointly by 21 environmental and consumer
groups) (on file with The Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law); An Assessment
of the North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small
Business, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992) [hereinafter Schott Assessment] (Statement of Jeffrey
J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics).
25. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO), Address Before the Citizen Trade
Campaign (Mar. 25, 1993), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, EXTRA File; see Keith
Bradsher, Trade Pact Signed in 3 Capitals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at D1.
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expected to foster industrial growth, environmentalists were con-
cerned that the agreement was not equipped to address the challenges
that this growth would present to already inadequately enforced
environmental laws. Environmentalists were particularly concerned
that ambiguous language in NAFTA would provide loopholes which
the Parties could use to justify inadequate environmental standards.
One point of contention revolved around the inclusion of certain
language from Article 20(b) of GAIT. This article allows for trade
restrictions that might not otherwise be tolerated under the GATT
rules, if the restrictions are "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health., 26  GAIT panels which have ruled on the
application of this phrase have interpreted it narrowly, allowing
environmental measures only if there are no alternatives which
present fewer restrictions on free trade.' In NAFFA, the GATI
provision was incorporated by prohibiting environmental regulations
from presenting "unnecessary obstacles" to trade.' Additionally, in
NAFTA Article 2101, the Parties specifically stated that GATT
Article 20(b) applied to environmental measures.29 Thus, when the
first NAFTA Free Trade Commission dispute panel is called upon to
interpret whether a given Party's environmental law is an "unneces-
sary obstacle" to trade, it may well turn to environmentally unfriendly
GATT precedents in defining the scope of this language."
This interpretative issue was highlighted when a GATr panel
report,31 issued during the negotiations over NAFTA, found that a
U.S. ban on Mexican tuna imports harvested without dolphin-safe nets
was in conflict with GAIT. 2 This GAIT panel report is representa-
tive of the basis for environmentalists' concerns that NAFTA would
result in the invalidation of U.S. laws and would compromise the
26. GATT, supra note 9, at 262 (citing art. 20(b)).
27. See, e.g., Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GAIT Doc. DS23/R (Feb.
7,1992).
28. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at 387 (citing art. 904(4)).
29. Id. at 699 (citing art. 2101).
30. Stanley M. Spracker et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade: NAFTA
as a Means of Eliminating Contamination as a Competitive Advantage, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVm. L.
REV. 669, 693 (1993) (discussing implications of GATT art. 20(b) language being included in
NAFTA).
31. GATT. Dispute Settlement Panel on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30
I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
32. James Sheehan, Clinton's Plan for the NAFTA Deal, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18,1993, at E4.
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ability of the United States to enforce rigorous environmental
standards. 33
This general fear of downward harmonization of laws and the
concern about the failure of NAFTA to regulate production processes
were the primary threats to the ratification of NAFTA in the United
States. 4 The likely result of greater economic integration among the
NAFTA Parties will be a move towards the harmonization of national
laws allowing goods and services to flow more efficiently across Party
borders.' However, with this harmonization, U.S. environmentalists
feared they would lose hard-fought domestic environmental victories
as tough United States and Canadian practices were watered down to
more closely align with the realities of sporadic Mexican enforce-
ment.36
Responding to these feelings of unease, then-Governor Bill
Clinton delivered an October 1992 Presidential campaign speech in
which he promised to pursue a supplemental agreement to NAFTA
which would require each Party to retain responsibility for its own
environmental laws and regulations.37 In this address, Clinton
declared that "we must establish an Environmental Protection
Commission with substantial powers and resources ... [that will]
encourage the enforcement of [each] country's own environmental
laws .... ,3 Clinton also stated that the environmental commission
should have the power to provide remedies, including the power to
assess money damages and the legal right to stop pollution.39 Thus,
Clinton promoted the use of supplemental agreements to address
what critics in the U.S. Congress and environmental groups viewed as
NAFTA's weaknesses.: Once Clinton became President, he
initiated negotiations of a supplemental agreement which included
33. See id.
34. See Schott Assessment, supra note 24, at 5; see also Spracker et al., supra note 30, at
693.
35. Stewart Baker, After the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAW. 765, 769 (1993).
36. 1&
37. Governor Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Student Center at North Carolina State
University (Oct. 4, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see Stephen Franklin & John N. Maclean, Foes Battle to Mold, If Not Kill, Free-
Trade Pact, CHI. TRmB., Feb. 22, 1993, at 3 (citing environmental groups' concerns over
NAFTA's enforcement tools and NAFrA's ability to ensure that the United States' strict
standards will not be compromised).
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trade sanctions. The trade sanction issue later developed into a major
point of contention between the Parties. 41
B. Concerns over the NAFTA Dispute Panel Process
Beyond the general concerns over how NAFTA was going to be
interpretted, many environmentalists specifically scrutinized and
criticized the dispute resolution process outlined in Article 20 of the
treaty.42 In particular, critics complained that environmental experts
were not required on the panels considering environmental com-
plaints. They also expressed concern over the lack of public
awareness and participation in the dispute resolution process.43
First, some environmentalists criticized the lack of environmental
experts on the Free Trade Commission as a feature which had limited
the effectiveness of trade panel dispute resolution in the past.'
While NAFTA allows for the solicitation of technical advice beyond
its normal roster of Free Trade Commission panelists, the Agreement
does not require expert participation.45 Rather, with Party approval,
a panel may solicit the opinions of a board of scientific experts on
concerns about "environmental, health, safety or other scientific
matters" at issue in the dispute.' However, the views of those
experts are merely advisory and consequently have no binding
effect.47 The complexity and breadth of issues that may be brought
before a Free Trade Commission dispute resolution panel will most
likely force generalist panels to resort to increased use of such expert
advice.' This use of expertise, particularly in specialized fields, may
have the positive effect of bolstering the panel's credibility, thereby
encouraging wider acceptance of panel reports in such areas. 49
41. Anne Swardson, Canada's Commons Approves Trade Pact with U.S., Mexico, WASH.
POST, May 28, 1993, at A32.
42. Se4 e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 238, 244, 255 (1992)
(testimony of Peter M. Emerson, Senior Economist, Environmental Defense Fund, and John J.
Audley, Trade Analyst, Sierra Club).
43. NAFTA and its Impact on the U.S. Economy, Wages and Jobs: Hearings of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (describing
specific complaints to the dispute resolution process under NAFTA).
44. Lori Wallach, Hidden Dangers of GA7T and NAFTA, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE
TRADE: GATT, NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER 23,57 (1993).
45. NAFTA, supra note 2, at 696 (citing art. 2014).
46. fr. at 696-97 (citing art. 2015(1)).
47. Id. (citing arts. 2014-2015).
48. Bialos & Siegel, supra note 4, at 621.
49. Id.
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Critics have thus argued that referral of technical issues to experts by
the Free Trade Commission should be mandatory, rather than merely
discretionary."
Also, critics in the United States attacked the perceived inability
of the public to contribute to, or even to receive adequate notice of,
the dispute resolution process under NAFTA Chapter 20 proce-
dures.5' Under Chapter 20, Free Trade Commission panel communi-
cations, deliberations, and hearings are confidential.52 Furthermore,
in issuing opinions, Free Trade Commission arbitral panelists are
prohibited from disclosing which panelists were associated with the
majority or dissenting opinions.53 Complaints are filed by national
governments and decided in proceedings where the public has no
voice or access to relevant information.'
The idea that those who are most affected by the resolution of
a dispute should have a say in the settlement procedure is not new.
Over twenty years ago, Philip C. Jessup, former Judge of the
International Court of Justice, remarked on the importance of public
involvement, notification, and participation in dispute resolution.5
He stated that "[i]t would be folly to provide for the settlement of
disputes" in the international arena without allowing for the participa-
tion of "those entities which will be as much concerned with enforce-
ment of the new standards as will governments of states."56 Howev-
er, the NAFTA Parties, in designing the Chapter 20 dispute resolution
procedures, provided for neither public disclosure of panel prelimi-
nary deliberations and decisions, nor public participation in the
dispute resolution process.57
50. Id.
51. See Wallach, supra note 44, at 43 ("NAFTA dispute panel provisions completely fail
to provide citizens from the NAFIA countries with the means to obtain information from, and
participate in, resolution of trade disputes concerning environmental, conservation, health, and
safety matters.").
52. NAFTA, supra note 2, at 696 (citing art. 2012(1)(b)).
53. Id. at 697 (citing art. 2017(2)).
54. See Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental
Agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REv. 593,614
(1993).
55. See Philip C. Jessup, Do New Problems Need New Courts?, 65 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROc. 261, 265 (1971).
56. Id. at 265.
57. NAFTA, supra note 2, at 697 (citing art. 2017(3)). After all relevant information is
given in confidence to the Commission only the final report of the panel is published. See id.
at 697 (citing art. 2017(4)).
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III. SIDE AGREEMENT FORMULATION
A. Side Agreement as a Means to Address Concerns with NAFTA
The Environmental Side Agreement and the CEC were formulat-
ed largely in response to concerns over interpretative issues regarding
the NAFTA text and the perceived limitations of the NAFTA dispute
resolution process in dealing with environmental matters under
Chapter 20. Addressing these concerns directly in the text of the
treaty was considered politically impracticable. 8 Acceptance of
NAFTA by the U.S. Congress and by the vocal environmental critics
depended, to a large extent, on the negotiators' ability to provide
assurances that Mexican environmental laws would be properly
enforced. 9 As a result, the Parties relied on the Environmental Side
Agreement to win the support necessary for NAFTA's ratification.'
Reaffirming the belief that stronger economic interdependence
must be linked with an increased commitment to environmental
protection, U.S. environmental NGOs drafted proposals for such an
environmental side agreement.6' Many of these proposals sought to
create an environmental commission to oversee the environmental
aspects of the treaty and to impose sanctions if a Party consistently
failed to enforce appropriate environmental standards.62 However,
these proposals were opposed by government officials and important
commercial interests in Canada63 and Mexico.' The Mexican
government conceded that to achieve NAFTA ratification, it was
58. See Supplemental Agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1993) (comments of Chairman Gibbons).
59. See Review of the President's Supplemental Agreements to the North American Free
Trade Agreement and an Update on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade Negotiations: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1993) (questions from Congressman Charles Canady to Ambassador Mickey Kantor); see also
Keith Schneider, Senate Panel Democrats Attack Free Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992,
at D2.
60. See generally Schneider, supra note 59, at D2.
61. Defenders of Wildlife et al., supra note 24 (calling for legally-binding agreement for all
NAFTA Parties which is of the same stature of NAFrA).
62. See Max Baucus, Freer Trade, A Greener Continent, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,1993, at A27.
Baucus is a Democratic Senator from Montana.
63. See Canada Business Lobby Refuses to Support Trade Sanctions, Fines in NAFTA Side
Pacts, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 986 (June 16, 1993).
64. See Mexican Official Says NAFTA Side Pacts Could be Completed in Several Weeks,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 976 (June 16, 1993).
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prepared to discuss labor and environmental side agreements.
However, Mexico was not willing to renegotiate the terms of the
NAFTA text or to empower a supranational commission which might
compromise national sovereignty.' Other U.S. environmentalists
and free-trade advocates also opposed an environmental commission
armed with sanctions that would have the authority to reimpose tariffs
based on environmental differences. 6
B. National Draft Proposals
At an early stage in the negotiations on the side agreement for
the environment, the Parties proposed a North American Commission
on the Environment (NACE) to serve as the principal institution for
addressing environmental concerns not covered by NAFTA' In the
final Environmental Side Agreement text, NACE ultimately evolved
into the CEC.' During this evolution, the most contentious issues
in the negotiation process included the overall structure of the
Commission, the limits of its authority, and its enforcement capabili-
ties concerning Party disputes.6 9
The U.S. negotiating text for the supplemental agreement
proposed two paths to promote effective enforcement of each Party's
environmental laws. First, Article 6 sought to provide for national
enforcement by requiring that each Party ensure that its citizens had
"appropriate access to administrative or judicial procedures for the
enforcement of the Party's environmental laws."70 Second, Article
65. See Diane Lindquist, No NAFTA Tinkering, Top Negotiator Warns, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRm., Sept. 27, 1992, at I-1.
66. Domestic critics of plans for a strong environmental commission urged that the United
States was by no means immune from charges that its own environmental enforcement was
ineffective. See Stephen L. Kass, Recent Developments in International Environmental Law, in
ENviRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE 1993, at 821, 866 (P.L.I. Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook No. 474, 1993). For example, the ambient air quality goals (NAAQS) of the Clean
Air Act remain largely unfulfilled after more than twenty years in force, and a provision of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(i), still calls for the end to effluent discharges in navigable
waters by 1985. Id.
67. Tom Meersman, A Green Thumbs Up? U.S., Canadian Environmentalists Divided on
Whether to Support NAFTA, STAR TRIB., May 31, 1993, at 1D.
68. Holly Hammonds, NAFTA is Good for the Environment, S.F. CHRON., July 13, 1993,
at A21.
69. Scott Otteman, U.S.-Backed Sanctions, Strong Commission Absent from Canadian
NAFTA Texts, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 24, 1993, at S-1.
70. U.S. Draft Legal Text forNAFTA Environment Pact, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21,1993
at S-10, S-11 [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]; see also Scott Otteman, U.S., Mexican NAFTA Green
Drafts at Odds on Sanctions, Panel Independence, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21, 1993, at S-1, S-
10.
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16 provided for the calling of a special session of the environmental
commission council whenever it was suspected that a Party was
following a "persistent and unjustifiable pattern of non-enforcement"
regarding its domestic environmental laws.71 Also in Article 16, and
seemingly in response to the vocal criticisms of the NAFrA Article
20 process, the United States sought to open the environmental
dispute resolution process to the public.2
The U.S. negotiating team also proposed that a Party to NAFTA
be permitted to impose trade sanctions for another Party's "persistent
and unjustifiable" failure to enforce its environmental laws.73 As
discussed above, the Clinton Administration's position differed from
the position taken by both the Bush Administration and the Canadian
and Mexican negotiating teams, which had not previously considered
sanctions in this context.74 Moreover, negotiators from Canada and
Mexico, as well as U.S. critics with a different vision for the environ-
mental commission, initially concluded that the sanctions sought by
the Clinton negotiating team were both overly aggressive and
counterproductive.75 The sanction issue subsequently developed into
a major source of contention between the Parties.7 6
Because of the effect the debate over sanctions had on the
ultimate institution charged with environmental oversight of the
NAFTA environmental provisions, this issue was crucial. What is
perhaps most important, is that without trade sanctions, ratification of
NAFTA itself would have faced increased opposition in the U.S.
Congress.77
While the Mexicans tried to preserve as much of the agreements
made with the Bush administration as possible, they had to accommo-
date enough of the Clinton proposal to ensure U.S. Congressional
71. U.S. Proposal, supra note 70, at S-13 (citing article 16(1)).
72. Id. at S-13 (citing art. 16(4)(c) which requires panel hearings to be public).
73. Id. at S-13 (citing art. 16(1)-(4)).
74. The Bush negotiating team, headed by former United States Trade Representative
Carla Hills, had sought an environmental commission with consultative, oversight, and activity
coordination roles, but which did not pursue environmental enforcement, or get involved with
dispute resolution. See Letter from Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative, to Jay Hair,
President, National Wildlife Federation (Sept. 29, 1992), in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 2, 1992,
at S-6, S-6.
75. See Otteman, supra note 69, at S-1.
76. Otteman, supra note 70, at S-1.
77. See Scott Otteman, U.S. Draft Texts for NAFTA Side Pacts Include Difficult-To-Reach
Sanctions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21, 1993, at S-17.
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ratification.' First, the Mexican government asserted that the
NAFTA text should not be renegotiated. 9 Second, citing the need
to respect national sovereignty, Mexico expressed disapproval of any
supranational institutions that had the power to interfere with a
national government's duty to enforce national law.'
Looking to recent events between the Parties, Mexican concern
over sovereignty guarantees was justified. In United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the abduction of a
Mexican national by U.S. agents for purposes of a criminal trial in the
United States did not violate the Extradition Treaty between Mexico
and the United States. Jurisdiction was affirmed on the grounds of
domestic law. Alvarez-Machain remains a recent enough reminder to
trigger concern over the respect the United States has for Mexico's
sovereignty.82
It is not surprising, therefore, that the initial Mexican proposal
did not provide for trade sanctions as a method of enforcement.
Instead, the Mexican proposal focused on the use of "sunshine
provisions" which would require that the commission's recommenda-
tions be made available to the public.' Like the U.S. proposal, the
Mexican draft included sections on the national enforcement of
environmental laws.' The Mexican negotiators adopted a standard
similar to that of the United States, requiring an "unjustifiable,
persistent and systematic failure" to properly enforce national
environmental laws before a complaint could be considered.' The
only role for public entities in the Mexican draft was through the
National Advisory Councils.
6
The Canadian draft for the regulation of the environmental
aspects of NAFTA under the Side Agreement also did not envision
78. See, e.g., Finlay Lewis, Salinas Being Wary on NAFTA, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept.
29, 1992, at E-1.
79. Housman et al., supra note 54, at 599-600.
80. Id.
81. United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
82. See Marjorie Miller, Salinas Hopes Clinton Meeting will Calm Trade-Pact Fears, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at A5.
83. Mexican Draft Text for NAFTA Environmental Pact, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21,1993,
at S-14, S-14 [hereinafter Mexican Proposal].
84. Id. at S-16 (citing art. 8(2)-(3) which ensures that each party will grant recourse to
persons with legal standing to pursue enforcement of environmental laws in an expeditious and
fair setting).
85. Id. at S-16 (citing art. 9(1)).
86. Id. at S-15 (citing art. 6).
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the use of trade sanctions to ensure national enforcement of law.'
Rather, an "Enquiry Committee" would be called upon if consulta-
tions between disputing Parties failed to bring resolution.' Howev-
er, the trigger for the establishment of such an Enquiry Committee
would not be as stringent as that required by the Mexican or
American proposals, but would require a mere "consistent pattern of
violation of the obligations" by a Party under the Agreement. 9 To
find such a pattern, the Enquiry Committee, through investigation and
publicly reported recommendations, would need to find "a pattern of
reliably documented violations" by the offending Party.'
National enforcement was also ensured under the Canadian draft
which required access to equitable administrative, quasi-judicial or
judicial procedures. 9' These equitable procedures included the
following rights: to request that an investigation be initiated, to bring
suit for damages, to pursue injunctions, to initiate private prosecu-
tions, and to seek review of tribunal action. 2
The Canadian draft also made proposals with regard to
transboundary pollution9' and the application of the Side Agreement
to subfederal units. 4  To combat transboundary pollution, the
Parties were required, within five years of the Agreement's execution,
to provide to victims of transboundary pollution "the same rights and
remedies" as were provided to their own citizens.9' The Canadian's
intense concern with the transboundary acid rain problem' helps
explain Canadian interest in the inclusion of such a provision. The
fact that the vast majority of Canadian environmental law is handled
at the provincial level by governments often wary of national powers
similarly provides insight into the Canadian proposal allowing
subfederal units to opt-out of the agreement.97
87. See Canadian Draft Text for NAFTA Environmental Pact, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 24,
1993, at S-2, S-6 [hereinafter Canadian Proposal].
88. Id. (citing art. 19(1)).
89. Id. "Consistent pattern of violations" is defined in the Canadian proposal as "a pattern
of reliably documented violations of a Party's obligations under this Agreement." Id.
90. Id. (citing art. 19(3)).
91. Id. at S-5 (citing art. 13(1)).
92. Id. (citing art. 13(2)(a)-(e)).
93. Id. (citing art. 14).
94. Id. at S-6 (citing art. 22).
95. Id. at S-5 (citing art. 14(3)).
96. See William A. Davis, Tourism and the Environment" The Fight Against Acid Rain,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1989, at B1.
97. The Consensus Report on the Constitution, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 3,1992, at A10
[hereinafter Consensus Report] (describing the Canadian Provinces' exclusive jurisdiction over
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Both U.S. environmental groups and business interests criticized
the U.S. proposal, although for entirely different reasons.18 Environ-
mentalists applauded the fact that sanctions were available," but
argued that both the standard by which enforcement was to be judged
and the procedures to be followed in the dispute resolution process
were flawed." These environmentalists claimed that penalizing a
Party for non-enforcement of domestic laws would act as a
disincentive to the promulgation of new and more aggressive
environmental laws.' Furthermore, the high hurdle of "persistent
and unjustifiable pattern of non-enforcement," coupled with the two
Party majority needed to convene a dispute resolution panel, could
ensure that the threat of sanctions would remain a hollow one.0 °2
Not surprisingly, the business coalitions also opposed the use of
trade sanctions to achieve national enforcement. 3 These critics
argued that the environment would be best protected by an environ-
mental commission that acted solely as a forum for discussion and
cooperation, -without playing a part in Party enforcement.' The
business coalitions objected to granting investigatory powers to the
commission. They also objected to' the commission having
unfettered reporting powers. 6 In the absence of effective safe-
guards, they argued, the commission could use its powers to harass
individual companies," . to engage in costly "fishing expedi-
cultural matters, which include many environmental issues).
98. See Sierra Club et al., Analysis of the U.S. Proposal for an Environmental Side
Agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement: Omissions and Ambiguities (June
8, 1993) (endorsed by 28 environmental groups) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative
and International Law); Letter from the Business Roundtable et al., to Mickey Kantor, United
States Trade Representative (June 4, 1993) [hereinafter Business Critique] (endorsed by eight
business organizations) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
99. See, eg., Meersman, supra note 67, at 1D.
100. See Sierra Club et al., supra note 98, at 3.
101. See id. at 4.
102. See id.; see also Stewart Hudson, NAFTA's Environmental Struggle, J. COMM., June 17,
1993, at 10A (noting that the road to sanctions under the U.S. draft proposal was "tortuous,"
and that the probability of trade sanctions becoming a realistic enforcement option was "almost
nil").
103. Business Critique, supra note 98, at 6.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1-2.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
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tions,"' 8 and to publish reports inaccurately accusing companies of
environmental infractions.'"
Contrary to the suggestions of Mexico, Canada and private
interest groups, the U.S. proposal for sanctions promised to make
NAFTA a more reliable agreement in the long term, an agreement
on which the Parties could rely, in lieu of more stringent unilateral
measures. In addition, the use of sanctions as promoted in the U.S.
negotiating proposal can be seen as both limited in scope and well-
defined in purpose. First, the U.S. proposal required "a persistent
and unjustifiable pattern of non-enforcement" before the process of
dispute resolution would be triggered."0 , Second, the sanctions
proposed by U.S. negotiators would only be used on rare occasions,
due to the extensive procedures required before sanctions would
become an option to settle a dispute. The first step following
initiation of the dispute resolution process would be a study and
consultation between the complaining and defending Parties."'
Then, only after a thirty-day period of consultations and a vote of two
of the three Parties, an arbitral panel would be convened."' If the
panel were to find a "persistent and unjustifiable pattern of non-
enforcement," a further round of mediation would follow."' Only
if the Parties failed to agree on an enforcement plan during this
second round of consultations would a Party be authorized to suspend
an "appropriate level" of NAFTA trade benefits." 4  The loss of
these trade benefits or the imposition of trade sanctions would last
only until the offending Party began to adequately enforce its
domestic environmental laws."5 It is unlikely that many disputes
would survive these mandatory dispute resolution procedures to reach
the point at which trade sanctions would be triggered.
In fact, if NAFTA lacked an effective enforcement procedure, far
more stringent unilateral trade responses might be required under
U.S. law. Under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) may be required
108. Id.
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. U.S. Proposal, supra note 70, at S-13 (citing art. 16(1)); see Canadian Proposal, supra
note 87, at S-6 (citing art. 19(1)). This standard would have been more difficult to satisfy than
that proposed by the Canadian negotiating team.
111. U.S. Proposal, supra note 70, at S-13 (citing art. 16(2)).
112. Id. (citing art. 16(3)).
113. ld. (citing art. 16(4)(e)-(f)).
114. Id. (citing art. 16(4)(h)).
115. Id.
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to respond to a violation of U.S. trade rights with retaliatory
action."' However, if a provision for sanctions already existed
within the structure of the treaty, no section 301 action would be
triggered by either Mexican or Canadian non-enforcement, as the
treaty provision would provide the required protection for U.S.
interests."7 Moreover, under the NACE structure as envisioned by
the U.S. negotiators, the United States would not be able to impose
trade sanctions until the full range of consultations and panel
investigation and Party voting had been completed." 8 ' Thus, by
including a provision for trade sanctions in the treaty, the actual
potential of the United States imposing sanctions against Mexico or
Canada may be lower, and certainly less objectionable, because
Mexico and Canada would have a chance to participate under the
procedural protections of the Environmental Side Agreement dispute
resolution process.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE
SIDE AGREEMENT
A. The Structure of the Commission on Environmental Cooperation
To understand the CEC's role in the enforcement of national law,
a general understanding of the structure of this new institution is
necessary." 9 Under the Environmental Side Agreement, the CEC
has maintained a three-institution structure consisting of a Council, a
Secretariat, and a Joint Advisory Committee."' The Council,
consisting of cabinet-level ministers from each Party government,'12-
will meet at least once a year and in special sessions at the request of
any Party." The second institution, the Secretariat, is headed by
116. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)-(c) (1988).
117. Id § 2411(a)(2)(A).
118. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 70, at S-13 (citing art. 16(4)(h)).
119. The United States proposed forming a Commission made up of a Council (headed by
the environmental ministers of each government), a Secretariat, and a Public Advisory
Committee. Id Likewise, Mexico proposed a Commission comprised of an Executive Commit-
tee of cabinet-level representatives, a Secretariat, and National Advisory Councils. See Mexican
Proposal, supra note 83, at S-15 (citing arts. 4-5(1)). Similarly, Canada proposed a Commission
consisting of a Secretariat, Government Advisory Bodies, and a Public Advisory Committee.
See Canadian Proposal, supra note 87, at S-2, S-4 (citing arts. 2, 3, 5, 6).
120. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1485 (citing art. 8).
121. d (citing art. 9).
122. Id
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an Executive Director who is to be chosen by the Council for a three-
year term." The Executive Director will appoint his own staff,
subject to a veto by a two-thirds vote of the Council. 24 The final
branch of the CEC is the Joint Public Advisory Committee, which will
be made up of five members provided by each Party, for a total of
fifteen members."~ One function of this Committee is to provide
advice to the Council on any relevant matter within the scope of the
Agreement."6
The structure of the CEC is designed to help the institution
discharge its significant responsibilities overseeing the environmental
aspects of NAFTA. However, although the CEC is assigned duties
ranging from the preparation of reports on the status of the environ-
ment within each Party's domain,"z to a substantive role in encour-
aging the Parties to properly enforce and comply with their domestic
environmental laws,"2 its own authority is limited. 9
B. The Process of Dispute Resolution Under the CEC
The dispute resolution process of the Environmental Side
Agreement is designed to address situations where a "persistent
pattern of failure by a Party to effectively enforce its environmental
law" is invoked by another Party.3  "Environmental law" is
broadly defined to include "any statute or regulation of a Party, or
provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protection of
the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or
health . ..131
The first step for a Party who perceives that another Party is
failing to enforce its domestic environmental law is to file a written
123. 1I at 1487 (citing art. 11(1)).
124. Id. (citing art. 11(2)-(3)).
125. Id. at 1489 (citing art. 16(1)).
126. Id. (citing art. 16(4)).
127. Id. at 1487 (citing art. 12(3)).
128. Id. at 1486 (citing art. 10(4)).
129. For example, the CEC can only respond to requests for inquiry for complaints which
are filed to further the enforcement of laws. It may not initiate the dispute resolution process
or issue trade sanctions on its own. See id. at 1488 (citing art. 14).
130. Id. at 1490 (citing art. 22(1)). A "persistent pattern" is described as "a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction beginning after the date of entry into force of this
Agreement." Id. at 1494-95 (citing art. 45(1)(b)).
131. Id. at 1495 (citing art. 45(2)(a)). This definition is only minimally constrained by the
caveat that an "environmental law" does not include any law "the primary purpose of which is
managing the commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of
natural resources." Id. at 1495 (citing art. 45(2)(b)).
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request with the CEC for consultations with that Party.1 2 A third
NAFTA Party that considers itself to have a substantial interest in the
dispute may also participate in these consultations upon request to the
Secretariat.'33 This initial consultative phase is designed to promote
a voluntary settlement between the Parties, and may last for up to
sixty days."
If the Parties cannot resolve the issue within this sixty-day period,
then each Party has the option of requesting that a special session of
the Council be convened.'35 The Council, charged with the goal of
"resolv[ing] the dispute promptly," will meet within twenty days of
this Party's written request.'36 If the Council decides that it would
be more proper for a GAIT dispute panel or the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission to address the issue, it may choose to refer the matter
back to the Parties for consideration under those agreements.137
If, however, the Council takes jurisdiction over the dispute and
the Parties do not reach agreement on the matter within sixty days
from the convening of the special session, then the complaining Party
may ask that an arbitral panel be convened. 38 The powers of such
an arbitral panel to investigate Party non-enforcement extend only to
situations involving goods or services which are traded between the
Parties or which compete, in the territory of the offending Party, with
like goods or services from another Party.1 39 This language appears
to be designed to limit the arbitral panel's review to trade-related
issues, and effectively filters out complaints which do not affect trade.
Seemingly in response to the sharp criticism of the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission's lack of mandatory technical expertise on its
dispute resolution panels,"4 the CEC Council will select panelists
from a list which includes environmental experts. 4' If necessary,
additional environmental expertise is available from special working
132. L at 1490 (citing art. 22(1)). Consultations are also the first step in the resolution of
interpretative differences under NAFTA. d. at 1489 (citing art. 20(1)).
133. Id. at 1490 (citing art. 22(3)).
134. Id. (citing art. 23(1)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing art. 23(3)).
137. Id. (citing art. 23(5)).
138. Id. (citing art. 24(1)).
139. d. (citing art. 24(1)(a)-(b)).
140. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
141. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1491 (citing art. 25(2)).
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groups," or from NGOs or independent experts.43  Technical
advice or information may also be sought from the bureaucratic
agencies of the Parties' own governments. 44 -
In deciding whether a Party has persistently failed to enforce its
domestic environmental laws, the arbitral panel will be guided by the
Model Rules of Procedure established by the Council. 45 These
rules will allow for a minimum of one hearing before the panel,"4
and the opportunity to submit initial and rebuttal positions in
writing. 47 However, as with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission
procedure under Article 20, NGOs will have no participation rights
in the panel process for the CEC.14
The arbitral panel has 180 days after the last panelist is selected
to determine if a persistent pattern of non-enforcement exists.'49 If
the panel finds such a pattern of non-enforcement, it must issue
recommendations for the ultimate resolution of the dispute.5 ' After
giving the Parties sixty days to respond to these recommendations, the
arbitral panel issues a final report.'' Apparently in response to
transparency concerns, the drafters of the Side Agreement required
that this important final report be made available to the public within
five days of its submission to the Council." 2
If the arbitral panel finds that a Party persistently failed to
enforce a domestic environmental law, then that party has sixty days
to formulate a remedy which is acceptable to the complaining Party
and in conformity with the requirements of the panel report.'53 Ift
however, the Parties involved in the dispute do not reach an
agreement on the remedy within this time frame, any Party may
request that the arbitral panel be reconvened. 54 The reconvened
142. Id. at 1490 (citing art. 23(4) which permits consultation with "technical advisers" or
"expert groups" by the Council as needed).
143. Id. at 1485 (citing art. 9(5)(b)).
144. See id. at 1492 (citing art. 30 which empowers the panel to consult with any "person or
body" that it determines would be helpful).
145. d. at 1491 (citing art. 28(1)-(2)).
146. Id. (citing art. 28(1)(a)).
147. Id. (citing art. 28(1)(b)).
148. Id. at 1492 (citing art. 29 which provides for participation by a third NAFTA Party
government but not by non-governmental groups).
149. Id. (citing art. 31(2)(b)).
150. ld. (citing art. 31(2)(c)).
151. Id. (citing art. 32(1)).
152. Id. (citing art. 32(3)).
153. Id. at 1492-93 (citing arts. 33, 34).
154. Id. at 1492 (citing art. 34(1)(b)(iii)).
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panel will then havd the power to assess a "monetary enforcement,"
or fine, against the offending Party."
Once the decision to impose a monetary enforcement assessment
is made, the arbitral panel will consider several factors in setting the
amount of the fine.15 6 First, the panel will consider the duration and
the pervasiveness of the Party's pattern of non-enforcement.15 7
Second, the panel will consider the resource constraints on the Party,
and whether the level of enforcement required by the environmental
law could be reasonably expected given the Party's financial state.5 '
Third, the panel will note the reasons provided by the Party for its
non-enforcement.5 9 Finally, the panel will acknowledge the efforts
made by the Party to remedy its pattern of non-enforcement since the
time when the final report was handed down."6 The amount of the
fine that an arbitral panel can assess may not exceed twenty million
dollars (U.S.) for claims arising in 1994, or after 1994, .007% of the
total trade between theParties during the most recent year.161
While the Agreement labels this monetary enforcement assess-
ment "final," 62 the offending Party, 180 days after being fined, may
request that the panel be reconvened in order to reconsider the
dispute." All monetary enforcement assessments are to be deposit-
ed into a fund established by the CEC for use by the Council to
improve "the environment or environmental law enforcement in the
Party complained against."164 In determining how the money from
the assessment fund should be used, the CEC will not be able to force
a program upon an unwilling offending Party.1 61
If the United States or Mexico is the offending Party and refuses
to pay the assessment, NAFTA empowers the complaining Party to
suspend trade benefits after 180 days for an amount no greater than
the assessment.16 Upon suspension of benefits, the complaining
Party may raise tariff rates against the defending Party. However, the
155. Id. at 1493 (citing art. 34(5)(b)).
156. See id at 1496 (citing Annex 34(2)).
157. Id. (citing Annex 34(2)(a)).
158. Id. (citing Annex 34(2)(b)).
159. Id. (citing Annex 34(2)(c)).
160. Id. (citing Annex 34(2)(d)).
161. IL (citing Annex 34(1)).
162. Il at 1493 (citing art. 34(6)).
163. Id. (citing art. 35).
164. Id. at 1496 (citing Annex 34(3)).
165. See iL at 1485 (citing art. 9(6)).
166. Id at 1493 (citing art. 36(1)).
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rates are capped by the lesser of the pre-NAFTA rate or the Most-
Favored-Nation rate for the goods in question. 67 Initially, the
complaining Party should seek to impose sanctions on the industry or
economic sector that benefitted from the non-enforcement of the
offending Party's environmental law.' If such-a sanction would not
be "practicable or effective," the complaining Party may suspend
trade benefits for other industries or economic sectors.'69 Thus, the
Parties themselves, not the CEC, retain the ultimate discretion in
deciding whether and.where to impose trade sanctions. Despite this
Party control of trade sanctions, limitations exist on the sanctions'
maximum amounts, their focus, and their duration.
Under the Side Agreement, trade sanctions may continue to be
applied to offending Party imports until the CEC has collected the
fine assessed by the arbitral panel. 70 If two complaining Parties
impose sanctions on either the United States or Mexico, the amounts
collected will be added until the assessed penalty has been
reached.' 1 The offending Party may request that the arbitral panel
reconvene to determine whether the Party has fully implemented the
action plan or has paid its monetary enforcement penalty.7 If the
arbitral panel rules that the Party has fully implemented its plan or
has paid its fine, the sanctions will be removed. 73 In addition, if the
offending Party feels that the sanctions imposed by the complaining
Party are "excessive," it may ask the arbitral panel to reconvene and
review the measures taken. 74 The arbitral panel will rule on the
appropriateness of the Party sanctions within forty-five days of such
a request.'75
A fine against Canada is handled using a separate procedure
from that described above.'76 To enforce an assessment against
Canada, the complaining Party must turn to the Canadian courts for
collection under the compromise achieved in the Side Agreement.'"
Upon request from the complaining Party, the CEC may initiate this
167. Id. at 1497 (citing Annex 36B(1)).
168. Id. (citing Annex 36B(2)(a)).
169. Id. (citing Annex 36B(2)(b)).
170. Id. at 1493, 1497 (citing art. 36(1), Annex 36B(1)).
171. Id. at 1493 (citing art. 36(3)).
172. Id. (citing art. 36(4)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1494 (citing art. 36(5)).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1496-97 (citing Annex 36A).
177. See id.
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process by filing a certified copy of the arbitral panel's report,
including the monetary assessment, in a Canadian court of competent
jurisdiction.' In subsequent proceedings to enforce the panel
determinations, the court will refer any questions of fact or interpreta-
tion back to the panel.' 9 Such panel decisions shall not be subject
to appeal or domestic review by the Canadian courts."8 Ultimate
enforcement determinations by a Canadian court are similarly
unreviewable by the CEC or the complaining Party.'8 '
A second important compromise inserted into the supplemental
text which protects Canadian interests is the "opt-out" provision for
the Canadian provinces.'" In Canada, the provinces rather than the
federal government oversee most environmental protection and
enforcement.'" Under the terms of the Agreement, Canada must
declare which of its provinces will be bound by the Environmental
Side Agreement.'" If any of the'provinces decide to opt-out of the
Agreement, Canada will be precluded from initiating dispute
resolution procedures in the CEC on behalf of those provinces.18
To ensure that such provinces do not unfairly reap the benefits of the
Agreement, Canada must show that all complaints are made either for
matters under Canadian federal jurisdiction or provincial jurisdiction
that accounts for at least fifty-five percent of Canada's Gross
Domestic Product.'" If a complaint targets a specific industry, then
at least fifty-five percent of total Canadian production in that industry
must occur in provinces that are subject to the Agreement."8
C. The Relation between the Dispute Resolution Processes under
the Environmental Side Agreement and Chapter 20 of NAFTA
Since the brief discussion in Section II of the Chapter 20 dispute
resolution procedures of the Free Trade Commission, this Note has
focused on the- Environmental Side Agreement's dispute resolution
mechanism. It is useful to analyze how these two processes will
interact. The sections of NAFTA that are most likely to involve
178. Id. at 1497 (citing Annex 36A(2)(a)).
179. Id. (citing Annex 36A(2)(f)).
180. Id. (citing Annex 36A(2)(g)).
181. Id. (citing Annex 36A(2)(h)).
182. Id. at 1494, 1497-98 (citing art. 41, Annex 41).
183. See Consensus Report, supra note 97, at A10.
184. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1497 (citing Annex 41(1)).
185. Id. at 1497-98 (citing Annex 41(3), (4)).
186. Id. at 1498 (citing Annex 41(4)(b)).
187. d. (citing Annex 41(4)(c)):
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environmental matters are Chapters 7B and 9, concerning sanitary
and phytosanitary measures and standards-related measures, respec-
tively." These sections could have an impact on a wide range of
issues, ranging from safety standards for children's sleepwear to the
kinds of pesticides allowed in vegetable cultivation. If any regulation
concerning such standards is challenged as a trade barrier, the dispute
will go to the Free Trade Commission governed by the NAFTA
Chapter 20 dispute resolution procedures. 89 Whenever an environ-
mental issue arises in such proceedings, the CEC may be called upon
to provide technical expertise."9 However, the process under the
Side Agreement will not be triggered. The dispute resolution
mechanism of the Side Agreement is reserved only for those occasions
when a Party has alleged a persistent pattern of non-enforcement of
an existing, democratically approved, environmental law.'9' While
the scope of "environmental law" will need to be refined in practice,
the Side Agreement process has a much narrower focus and is
supplementary to the broader roles of the Free Trade Commission in
Party dispute settlement.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS OF THE CEC
A. Use of Sanctions
One of the most hotly debated and perhaps most significant
issues discussed by the Parties and commentators in the proposed
Environmental Side Agreement was whether the dispute resolution
mechanism would utilize trade sanctions."9  Resolution of the
sanctions issue would ultimately define the role of the CEC itself. If
limited to a support role, the CEC would not need the extensive
powers detailed in the U.S. draft proposal. 93 If, however, the CEC
were to play a central role in the arbitration of disputes with the
potential for trade sanctions, the status and autonomy of the
188. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at 377-83, 386-93 (citing chs. 7B, 9).
189. See id. at 693-99 (citing ch. 20).
190. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1486 (citing art. 10(6)(c)(iii)).
191. let at 1490 (citing art. 22(1)).
192. See Baucus, supra note 62, at A27 (stressing the importance of trade sanctions to
achieve Party enforcement of environmental law).
193. See supra notes 70-76, 98-115 and accompanying text.
1994]
110 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:87
institution would have to be more prominent than foreseen by the
Canadian and Mexican proposals.'
Although this Note has focused on the CEC's role in the
resolution of Party disputes and on the use of sanctions to achieve
Party enforcement of environmental law, the CEC will perform many
additional functions as well. In fact, the ultimate power of the
institution will depend in large measure on the practices that are
established for handling environmental issues as they arise, and the
support of the Parties in addressing these issues within the CEC
structure. Under the Environmental Side Agreement, the CEC is
given broad responsibility for protecting the North American
environment. Among its other duties, the CEC must analyze
environmental matters, oversee Party environmental efforts, promote
public awareness of the environment, and facilitate cooperation
between the Parties on environmental matters.195 The CEC's
ultimate effectiveness will hinge on its ability both to project an image
of competent authority and to convince the Parties to accept its
recommendations.
While trade sanctions will play only a limited role in the
enforcement of environmental law in North America, certain
commentators see any use of trade sanctions to pursue environmental
goals as potentially problematic.196 First, in making determinations
on Party enforcement, the CEC, as an outside body, would be second-
guessing local decision-makers, raising accountability concerns and
risking downward harmonization." Second, remedial measures
determined by a supranational institution will likely ignore the local
political and cultural concerns that are inevitably tied to environmen-
tal decisions.' Third, a dispute resolution process that utilizes
trade sanctions as an enforcement measure may overemphasize sticks
rather than carrots." In a country with limited resources with
which to remedy environmental problems, carrots are more suitable
in achieving a sustainable infrastructure.2' Finally, the unequal
effects of trade sanctions upon the NAFrA trading partners will
194. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
195. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1485-87 (citing art. 10(1)-(2)).
196. See, e.g., Richard A. Johnson, Commentary: Trade Sanctions and Environmental
Objectives in the NAFTA, 5 GEO. INT'L ENvTL L. REV. 577 (1993).
197. Id. at 586.
198. See id
199. Id. at 587.
200. Id. (describing potential carrots as the providing of technical assistance and regional
coordination of environmental matters).
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provide unequal incentives to enforce environmental laws."
Canada and Mexico rely much more heavily on trade with the United
States than vice versa. Thus, trade sanctions against these countries
could have a more potent discouraging effect since a larger part of
their economy would be affected.- 2
Instead of using the threat of sanctions to spur environmental
enforcement, the Parties might alternatively attempt to advance
environmental protection by relying on "soft law" options?2 3
Sometimes called "sunshine provisions," these options have the
desired effect of increasing consumer awareness, providing for
innovative technical assistance, and possibly producing faster and
longer lasting environmental protection than "hard law" approach-
es.' 4 In addition, these soft law approaches serve to counter the
market forces inherent in trade-related sanctions by including the
public in the process and allowing an impartial Commission to resolve
the disputes.0 5 The net result is a more democratic and less legalis-
tic system of environmental enforcement.
B. Public Access
Other criticisms of the CEC's dispute resolution process focus on
the limited public access to the process.' In making the choice to
restrict non-Party access, the negotiators of the Side Agreement
recognized the possible abuse of access by those seeking to harass or
to pursue protectionist aims on behalf of private interests. However,
while the goal of excluding those with improper motives from the
dispute resolution process of the CEC is certainly a credible one, the
cost of such protection may exceed its worth.2"
201. Id. at 588 (explaining that trade with the United States accounts for 15% of Mexico's




204. Id. at 589-90.
205. 1d at 590.
206. See, eg., Robert Housman et al., supra note 54, at 614.
207. Id. An alternate vision, proposed by the Center for International Environmental Law
and Defenders of Wildlife, was designed to create a NAFTA environmental institution that
would block protectionist harassment while maintaining a democratic character in the dispute
settlement process. Under this proposal, any citizen or NGO could issue a complaint of Party
non-enforcement to the environmental commission, but that body could screen and select cases
for the formal review process. While recognizing that for practical purposes, complaints by the
Party governments should get a certain degree of preference, a screening process like the
granting of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court could provide a useful model.
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The CEC's dispute resolution structure sets out a difficult path
for the private citizen or NGO to advance a claim of Party non-
enforcement of environmental law.' A complaining group, other
than a Party government, is allowed to initiate a claim with the
Secretariat." However, the best result that this group can hope for
is that the Secretariat will compile and submit a factual record to the
Council.210 In addition, this record can only be made public by a
vote of two-thirds of the Council.' Without this vote, not even the
complaining Party will have access to the record. Some of the
additional obstacles that a private complaining party will have to
overcome to get a record, submitted to the Council include the
following: (i) persuading the Secretariat that the complaint deserves
to be investigated;2 2 (ii) ensuring that the claim is not pending
review before any Party's domestic judicial or administrative
forum; and (iii) convincing at least two-thirds of the Council to
direct the Secretariat to compile a factual record on the com-
plaint.214
One potential method for providing increased public access to the
NAFTA environmental dispute resolution process is to allow any
interested private party to submit written briefs to the arbitral panel
outlining a case for or against Party enforcement.2 t5 Oral arguments
before the panel by the complaining Party and complained-against
Party could be supplemented by amici curiae where the Parties and
the panel agree that such arguments should be heard.21 6 By utilizing
this method, private parties could ensure that the dispute resolution
process does not overlook their valid interests in the environment.
Protectionist motives would be further thwarted by the focus on governmental enforcement
efforts, not on action against private citizens or commercial entities. Since only a NAFTA Party
can be required to respond to a charge of non-enforcement, there is a reduced chance that one
with a special interest would be able to subvert the process and harass a competitor. Id. at 615.
208. See Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1488 (citing art. 14(1)).
209. Id.
210. 1d. at 1488 (citing art. 15(1)).
211. Id. at 1489 (citing art. 15(7)).
212. See id at 1488 (citing art. 15(1)).
213. Id. at 1488 (citing art. 14(3)(a)).
214. Id. at 1488 (citing art. 15(2)).
215. Housman et al., supra note 54, at 617.
216. Id.; cf Sup. Cr. R. 37 (allowing groups interested in litigation appearing before the
Supreme Court to submit written briefs and make oral arguments).
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C. Sovereignty
Other criticisms of the Side Agreement, more easily overstated,
warn that trade sanctions may lead to the loss of national sovereignty
in the enforcement of environmental law."7 Several points suggest,
however, that the existing CEC will not seriously threaten national
sovereignty. The CEC evaluates Parties only with respect to their
own laws and has no power to set independent standards for
environmental protection."' 8  Further, the imposition of trade
sanctions against a Party would not require any change in that
country's practices. Rather, any Party found to be denying trade
benefits to its NAFTA partners through its ineffective enforcement
of environmental law could simply be held accountable for the
subsequent losses2 9
Moreover, the Parties have included explicit exceptions within the
Environmental Side Agreement to ensure that Party sovereignty will
not be threatened by the CEC. For example, a Party will not be held
to have failed to enforce its environmental laws if any action or
inaction "reflects a reasonable exercise of [its] discretion.""2  Nor
will a Party be held liable for trade sanctions if non-enforcement
"results from bona-fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement
in respect of other environmental matters determined to have higher
priorities."'" In actuality, these extremely broad sovereignty-
protection clauses could potentially swallow environmental enforce-
ment if not contained by the CEC.
Another fear related to the sovereignty debate, and also easily
overstated, is that sanctions for environmental non-enforcement will
hamper Party prosecutorial discretion. Some critics have expressed
concern that the autonomy of government authorities to decide what
laws to enforce and how to enforce them may be infringed upon if a
supranational body oversees national enforcement.' Often in the
217. Finlay Lewis, Side Accords Bring NAFTA Few Converts Gebhardt Joins Opposition
After Deals Announced, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 14, 1993, at Al.
218. See Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 1, at 1488, 1490 (citing arts. 14(1),
22(l)).
219. See id. at 1492-93,1496 (citing art. 34, Annex 34) (describing the imposition of monetary
enforcement assessments).
220. Id. at 1494 (citing art. 45(1)(a)).
221. lIt at 1494 (citing art. 45(1)(b)).
222. See Harold Gilliam, How Green is NAFTA? Two Environmentalists-One Pro, One
Con-Take on the Treaty, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 24, 1993, § Z-1, at 5 (describing impact of NAFTA
environmental provisions on domestic environmental laws).
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environmental field, the threat of enforcement can motivate industry
to take voluntary steps that support environmental protection but that
do not initially achieve statutory compliance. For example, a factory
may be allowed to discharge air pollutants in excess of the statutory
limit while it installs the latest in environmental scrubber technology
to bring the facility into full statutory compliance. While concerns
over national prosecutorial discretion are valid, they need not be
grounds for abandoning trade sanctions altogether. Rather, guidelines
are needed to enable the CEC to distinguish between productive
prosecutorial discretion and protective prosecutorial abuse.'
Additionally, NAFTA, built on previous agreements between the
Parties and reaching new areas of regulation, is full of compromises
which could be seen as waivers of Party sovereignty. In the fields of
intellectual property, antitrust, and trade regulation, for example, the
Parties have agreed to new mechanisms for supranational enforcement
of relevant provisions in order to foster efficient economic re-
turns. 4 The oversight of environmental enforcement in the Side
Agreement should not present any more of a threat to Party
sovereignty than these existing regulatory measures.
Only a few of the many potential criticisms of the CEC dispute
resolution process have been addressed here. This discussion by no
means attempts to cover the field or exhaust the debate on this
subject. Thus, rather than attempting to address all potential glitches
in the process, perhaps it is better at this early stage to remember that
many of the perceived defects in the CEC dispute resolution process
can be cured in practice. In addition, model rules can be installed
either to provide greater public access to arbitral proceedings or to
allow NGOs to participate in the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inherent in the procedures developed for the CEC is the hope
that most disputes will be settled early in the consultative stages,
without the need for trade sanctions. While the probability of trade
sanctions being issued may be quite low, the threat of such measures
will, nonetheless, serve a valuable purpose if it brings the Parties to
223. See Housman et al., supra note 54, at 620 (proposing a set of criteria to differentiate
prosecutorial discretion from prosecutorial abuse).
224. NAFrA, supra note 2, at 663-64, 670-81 (citing chs. 15 and 17, describing NAFTA
handling of competition policy and intellectual property matters, respectively).
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the dispute resolution process with a common interest in compli-
ance." Success in the consultative stage would render the rest of
the resolution process, including the use of trade sanctions, unneces-
sary. This process represents a positive step forward in securing
strong international relationships and a healthy trade agreement.
Any trading relationship is threatened when one partner takes
unilateral measures that can be viewed as an attempt to extend its
own risk preference beyond its territory and onto its trading partners'
territory."6 Such measures inevitably create resentment and foster
an atmosphere where retaliatory action becomes politically neces-
sary. 7  Moreover, the atmosphere created by unilateral action
inhibits trade efficiency, which in turn slows economic growth, a
necessary element of the greater goal of sustainable development.'
By offering an alternative to such unilateral action, the NAFTA
dispute resolution process helps to protect relationships between the
Parties.
By striking a balance between the capacity of trade sanctions and
respect for national sovereignty, the dispute settlement procedures of
the CEC also provide the NAFTA Parties with an effective tool to
encourage enforcement of domestic environmental law. With this
goal, trade sanctions will be effective even if the non-enforcing Party
can absorb the monetary enforcement assessment rather than alter its
environmental practices. In such a scenario, the trade sanctions will
serve to increase the costs of the goods or services produced by the
benefits of non-enforcement.
NAFrA and the Environmental Side Agreement may well have
the positive effect of locking Mexico into a "greener" agenda, while
ensuring that the United States' southern neighbor does not become
a "pollution haven" for American companies seeking to avoid
environmental restrictions. To some extent, the Environmental Side
Agreement was pursued to address public and political concerns in
225. See Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1373, 1385-86 (1992) (stressing the importance of both carrots and sticks in
environmental reform).
226. See, eg., Thomas L. Friedman, Japan Warns of Retaliation for U.S. Trade Sanctions,
HOuS. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1994, at A23 (describing the hostile response by Japan to a potential
unilateral attempt by the United States to raise tariffs on Japanese imports).
227. See id.
228. But see Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Received
Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 385, 386 (1993) (discussing the positive effects of unilateral trade sanctions in protecting the
environment).
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the United States over law enforcement in Mexico. 9 While Mexico
has many of the same interests as the United States and Canada in a
clean environment, in the past it has lacked the resources to carry out
its environmental goals. Increased trade as a result of NAFTA could
provide the necessary' resources needed to realize the common goal
of a cleaner environment.30
Finally, in creating an institution that will foster environmental
enforcement along with trade liberalization, NAFTA sends a signal to
the greater global trading community M The effects of the Environ-
mental Side Agreement will be felt far beyond the territories of the
three Parties. Almost certainly, the Agreement will serve as a
reference from which the Parties can begin future bilateral or
multilateral trade negotiations. It is widely thought that NAFTA will
expand to cover much of the Western Hemisphere by the turn of the
century? 32 The achievements of the treaty will influence both the
method whereby future trade agreements address environmental
concerns, and the environmental agenda within each country hoping
to become a member of NAFrA. Ultimately, by ensuring that
environmental laws are enforced and that costs are internalized, trade
can be a mechanism to promote the greater interest of sustainable
development.
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